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 We researched incentive programs design and implementation worldwide.
 This paper seeks to inform future policy and program design.
 We identify design and identify advantages and disadvantages.
 We ﬁnd that incentive programs have greater impact when they target highly efﬁcient products.
 Program designs depend on the market barriers addressed and the local market context.
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a b s t r a c t
Incentives are policy tools that sway purchase, retail stocking, and production decisions toward energy-
efﬁcient products. Incentives complement mandatory standards and labeling policies by accelerating
market penetration of products that are more energy efﬁcient than required by existing standards and by
preparing the market for more stringent future mandatory requirements. Incentives can be directed at
different points in the appliance's supply chain; one point may be more effective than another
depending on the technology's maturity and market penetration. This paper seeks to inform future
policy and program design by categorizing the main elements of incentive programs from around the
world. We identify advantages and disadvantages of program designs through a qualitative overview of
incentive programs worldwide. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial incentive programs have greater impact when
they target highly efﬁcient technologies with a small market share, and that program designs depend on
the market barriers addressed, the target equipment, and the local market context. No program design is
inherently superior to another. The key to successful program design and implementation is a thorough
understanding of the market and identiﬁcation of the most important local obstacles to the penetration
of energy-efﬁcient technologies.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Numerous studies have demonstrated that the penetration
of energy-efﬁcient equipment is far below the level that is cost-
effective for energy consumers (IPCC, 2007; McNeil et al., 2008;
Letschert et al., 2012). Energy-efﬁciency policies seek to close this
gap (Golove and Eto, 1996) by identifying and addressing the
barriers that prevent consumers from investing in energy-efﬁcient
equipment. These barriers are diverse, including lack of informa-
tion, split incentives (e.g., between landlords and renters), high
transaction costs (costs of participating in a market), lack of
technical expertise, and lack of energy-efﬁcient equipment on
the market (Eto et al., 1996; Sathaye and Murtishaw, 2004; Jollands
et al., 2010; Murphy and Meier, 2011). One of the most signiﬁcant
barriers that policy makers identify to the purchase of energy-efﬁcient
equipment is the relatively higher up-front costs of efﬁcient products.
In many instances, these costs deter potential purchasers even when
investments appear to be in consumers’ interest (i.e., when invest-
ments are cost effective over the equipment lifetime). Consumers
place great value on immediate savings and heavily discount future
savings (Hausman, 1979; Houston, 1983). Moreover, because they may
not be able to easily evaluate future savings, consumers tend to have a
low degree of conﬁdence in expected paybacks. As a result, consumers
often purchase the cheapest options available.
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Numerous incentive programs have been developed worldwide
to address these barriers and accelerate the penetration of more
efﬁcient equipment. A recent study by the Buildings Performance
Institute Europe (BPIE) screened 333 different ﬁnancial schemes in
Europe alone (BPIE, 2011). The DSIRE database records more than
1300 programs in the United States. (DSIRE, 2013). In some instances,
these programs are part of national government energy-efﬁciency
policies; in others, the programs are part of utilities’ integrated
resource planning strategies.
Although the literature describes energy-efﬁciency policy gen-
eral (IEA, 2010; WEC, n.d.; Ortiz et al., 2009; Geller and Attali,
2005), the design and use of incentives worldwide has not been
comprehensively studied. The literature addresses incentives in
the United States (e.g., Nadel et al., 2003; DSIRE, 2013; Fuller et al.,
2010; U.S. EPA, 2010; Eto et al., 1996), in Europe (BPIE, 2012; Vine,
1996), and, to some extent, internationally (Hilke and Ryan, 2012;
Sarkar and Singh, 2010; Birner and Martinot, 2005). However,
it rarely reports on the speciﬁc design or mechanisms by which
programs aim to accelerate market penetration of residential
appliances and equipment. For example, the recent BPIE (Maio et
al., 2012) and IEA reports (Hilke and Ryan, 2012) address incen-
tives that target building improvements but do not address the
mechanisms that target residential appliances.
This paper attempts to remedy this gap in the literature by
describing the main design characteristics of incentive programs
that encourage consumers to purchase highly efﬁcient residential
appliances and equipment. The paper's objective is to provide
those policy makers and program administrators considering
implementing incentive programs an understanding of what these
key characteristics are and what tradeoffs are involved with them.
We ﬁrst describe the regulatory frameworks that govern develop-
ment of incentive programs in major economies, to characterize
how incentives are being implemented globally. We then categor-
ize the main elements of incentive program designs and analyze
advantages and disadvantages of a variety of program designs.
Finally, we provide a variety of examples to illustrate how
programs in several major economies attempt to accelerate market
penetration of efﬁcient residential equipment and appliances.
2. Overview of policy frameworks and program designs
2.1. Policy frameworks
The typical policy frameworks in which incentive programs
develop are either (1) direct government roll-outs with money
raised through taxes or (2) mandatory savings goals (also referred
as obligations) set for energy providers (also referred as utilities) to
reduce their customers’ energy use. This is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Incentive programs have been principally implemented by
governments to fuel long-run growth of domestic clean product
markets. By increasing production of efﬁcient products that are
at an early stage of development, incentive programs help tech-
nology (and thus the market) mature and spur private-sector
investment. Implementation of incentive programs can also be
motivated by the need to boost an economy in times of recession;
governments deploy incentive programs to stimulate economic
activity while also promoting clean technology development.
Governments have also created regulatory frameworks that
compel energy providers to deliver energy savings. Energy provi-
ders often then become the administrators of energy-efﬁciency
programs. Utilities’ direct link to energy consumers and access to
valuable data on energy usage patterns are a signiﬁcant advantage
in designing effective programs. However, energy efﬁciency is not
an obvious business for utilities to undertake because when
consumers save energy, utilities sell less of their product. Some
U.S. states have developed market regulations to remove utilities’
disincentive to conserve energy and to incentivize utilities to
invest in efﬁciency. These include regulations that decouple
revenue and electricity sales and shareholder incentives to achieve
energy efﬁciency beyond targets (Satchwell et al., 2011; EEWG,
2008; U.S. EPA, 2007; Schultz and Eto, 1990). In some cases, the
responsibility for meeting savings goals is delegated to a third
party or government agency that implements the programs.
Table 1 lists countries that have policy frameworks mandating
that energy providers save energy.
Utilities in the United States have the longest experience – more
than three decades – in executing energy-efﬁciency programs.
However, the scope and intensity of these programs vary signiﬁ-
cantly among states. Twenty-seven U.S. states have set efﬁciency
goals for their electric energy providers, and 12 also have goals for
natural gas providers (DSIRE, 2012). According to the Consortium
for Energy Efﬁciency's 2012 annual report (CEE, 2012), a total of US
$8 billion was budgeted for gas and electric efﬁciency programs in
2011, a 20-percent increase over the previous year. Of this funding,
one-third is allocated to residential-sector efﬁciency measures.
California has by far the largest share of rate-funded programs,
with a budget of US$3.1 billion over three years and a requirement
that about 1.3 percent of annual sales be met with energy-efﬁciency
programs. Massachusetts has one of the most aggressive targets,
2.4 percent of annual sales.
In Europe, the UK was the ﬁrst country to implement an
obligation scheme in 1994, the Energy Companies Obligation
(ECO). ECO has evolved and is now combined with another scheme
called the Green Deal (DECC, 2011).
Other European countries—Denmark, the Flemish region of
Belgium, Italy, France, and recently, Poland—have also implemen-
ted energy-saving obligation schemes (Lees, 2012; Staniaszek and
Lees, 2012; Heffner et al., 2013). In France and Italy, the efﬁciency
targets are accompanied by trading markets where a unit of
energy savings known as a “white certiﬁcate” can be either sold
or purchased. Energy saved in any sector counts toward meeting
an obligation. A new EU directive on energy efﬁciency requires
that all EU Member States implement utility energy savings
obligations equivalent to 1.5 percent of annual sales (EC, 2012),
so other European countries are expected to follow the example of
those that have already adopted these schemes.
Other examples of savings obligation schemes around the globe
include those in some Australian states, Brazil, South Korea, South
Africa, China, and India (Balawant, 2012; Lees, 2012). The Austra-
lian state of New South Wales implemented the world's ﬁrst
mandatory greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme in
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Fig. 1. Incentive program policy framework.
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2003, in which GHG emissions from electricity sales are capped
each year (IPART 2008, 2010). Since 1998, the Brazilian power
regulatory authority, ANEEL, has mandated that utilities invest
at least 0.5 percent of their net revenues in energy-efﬁciency
programs (Taylor et al., 2008). Programs are funded through a
wire charge. The Brazilian Congress requires that about half of
these funds must be spent on energy-efﬁciency measures targeted
at low-income households. According to Taylor et al. (2008),
investments from the wire charge proceeds are about ﬁve times
greater than investments by PROCEL, the government program for
electricity-sector efﬁciency.
Similarly, in South Korea, the Rational Energy Utilization Act
covers investments rather than focusing on speciﬁc energy sav-
ings. The act requires that each energy utility establish an annual
DSM investment plan with a total budget greater than the
previous year's (Balawant, 2012).
In South Africa, the government set an initial energy-savings
target of 4055 GW h (and 1037 MW) for the period 2011–2013.
Eskom, South Africa's only utility, was allocated a budget of R
5445M (US$651 million) for programs to meet the target. A new
phase, the Multi-year price determination 3, started in March 2013
with approved funding of R 5183M (USD 641M) for a period of
5 years, 2013 to 2018; savings goal are yet to be decided.
In China and India, utility efﬁciency programs are still in early
stages of development. In November 2010, China adopted national
energy-efﬁciency regulations that took effect on January 1, 2011
and require China's power grid companies to save the equivalent
of at least 0.3 percent of their sales volume and 0.3 percent of
maximum load compared with the previous year (Finamore et al.,
2010; Plunkett et al., 2012). In India, the Maharashtra Electricity
Regulatory Commission (MERC) instituted a public-beneﬁts type
of electricity charge on utilities, with the funds to be used to
ﬁnance renewable-energy and energy-efﬁciency programs in the
state. In late 2005, MERC ordered utility companies in the state to
use these resources to start CFL programs in Mumbai's residential
sector and in the Nasik District (Sathaye et al., 2006).
As can be seen from these examples, governments around the
world are developing policy frameworks to increase the role of
energy efﬁciency in meeting new energy demand. These new
regulations often lead to the development of incentive programs.
2.2. Funding sources
Financial incentive programs are capital-intensive endeavors,
entailing not just administration costs but also the costs of monetary
incentives for each participating appliance unit. A variety of sources
are tapped for funds, each with strengths and weaknesses. To
transform markets, schemes must be viable over the long term, so
funding must be sustainable. In addition, the scale of the funding
must match the magnitude of the objective. And, because large
capital transfers are involved, transparency is critical.
In most cases, government-sponsored incentive programs are
funded through general government budgets ﬁnanced by taxpayers.
In the case of special stimulus packages, funding comes from
exceptional funds, such as the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009 in the United States. Governments of developing
countries or economies in transition can seek ﬁnancial support from
international ﬁnancial institutions such as the World Bank, the
Clean Technology Fund, and the Global Environmental Facility. For
example, Mexico's Programa Nacional para la Sustitución de Equi-
pos Electrodomésticos (PNSEE) is supported by loans from the
World Bank and capital from the Global Environmental Fund (WB,
2010). India's Super-Efﬁcient Equipment Program (SEEP) for electric
fans will be supported by the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), which is
administered by World Bank (Chunekar and Singh, 2013).
These funding sources can leverage large amounts of capital
but tend to have a short-term horizon. Incentive programs that
result from a goal set for an energy provider's sales have a longer
term horizon. They are funded either explicitly or implicitly by
ratepayers. Explicit mechanisms charge a deﬁned amount as part
of the electricity rate. In the United States, South Africa, South
Korea, and Brazil, energy-efﬁciency programs are generally funded
by a small levy or charge – a fraction of a cent per kilowatt-hour –
on electricity sales. This levy goes into a common public fund that
is used to recover the cost of implementing programs (Eto et al.,
1998). Implicit mechanisms include the cost of energy-efﬁciency
programs as part of the rate base used to determine retail energy
prices. This is the case in the UK where the energy market is
liberalized, and utilities recover their costs through their tariffs.
Price impacts in the UK have been estimated at approximately
1.5 percent (Eyre et al., 2009).
Table 1
Examples of energy provider regulatory obligations.
Country Policy Time frame Obligation
Australia (New South Wales [NSW], Victoria,
South Australia)
State-based energy-efﬁciency schemes Since 2003 in
NSW
Electricity and natural gas
(electricity only in NSW)
Belgium– Flanders Energy-saving obligation schemes Since 1995 Electricity
Brazil Wire charge (PEE) Since 1998 Electricity
Canada Province-based energy-efﬁciency schemes Since 1985 Electricity and natural gas
China National energy efﬁciency regulations 2011 to present Electricity
Denmark Demand-side management scheme Since 1995 Electricity, district heating,
natural gas and heating oil
EU Directive for energy saving obligations for member
countries
TBD TBD
France White certiﬁcates Since 2006 Electricity, natural gas, and gasoline
India (Maharashtra) Maharashtra public beneﬁts-type charge 2005 to present Electricity
Italy White certiﬁcates Since 2005 Electricity and natural gas
Poland Energy-saving obligation scheme Since 2011 Electricity, district heating, natural gas
South Africa The Standard Offer Program Since 2011 Electricity
South Korea Rational Energy Utilization Act Since 1995 Electricity, district heating, natural gas
US Utility-sector customer energy-efﬁciency programs
and now
energy-efﬁciency resource standard
Since 1975 Electricity & natural gas
UK Energy Efﬁciency Standards of Performance (EESoP),
which became
the Energy Efﬁciency Commitment (EEC), which then
became the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT)
Since 1998 Electricity and natural gas (residential
sector only)
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Other funding mechanisms are less common and often less
ﬂexible. For example, a revolving fund can be established in
programs where ﬁnancial incentives are paid back with accrued
energy savings. A prominent example of a revolving fund is the
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) created by the German
government. The KfW Institution partners with private banks to
offer advantageous loan conditions to consumers wishing to invest
in energy-efﬁciency improvements (KfW Bankengruppe, 2011).
Revolving funds are an excellent source of capital for energy
efﬁciency over the long term. However, these funds are generally
better suited to programs that support investment in or refurb-
ishment of large equipment.
Earmarked taxes can ﬁnance speciﬁc energy-efﬁciency pro-
grams. These taxes are especially powerful when they are applied
to energy-consuming products and the resulting revenues are
used to support purchase of efﬁcient alternatives. For example,
South Korea introduced a 5- to 6.5-percent tax on energy-
consuming home appliances; the revenues from this tax were
used to subsidize the purchase of highly efﬁcient products by low-
income households (IEA, 2010). This type of policy is sometimes
referred as a feebate; a tax or “fee” on less-efﬁcient equipment is
used to fund a rebate on more efﬁcient equipment. If designed and
monitored carefully, this ﬁnancing mechanism can be a revenue-
neutral policy and can be independent of government general
budgets. However, careful, continuous monitoring is required to
make sure the balance is kept.
The recently introduced “Programmatic Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM)” approach for ﬁnancing energy-efﬁciency pro-
jects is being used in India's Bachat Lamp Yojana (BLY) program.
Under this program, the state utility receives CDM revenues based
on the number of CFLs sold; these funds are passed on to the
consumer in the form of rebates on CFLs that reduce or eliminate
the cost difference between the price of a CFL and an incandescent
bulb. Several utility companies in India have implemented the BLY
program (BEE (Bureau of Energy Efﬁciency) (no date)).
Table 2 lists the main funding approaches described in this
subsection, with examples.
2.3. Program designs
The key challenge of incentive program design is to achieve
durable market transformation (Rosenberg and Hoefgen, 2009;
Nadel and Latham, 1998; Eto et al., 1996). Programs need to be
tailored to address the different stages of an energy-efﬁcient
product's market diffusion in order to accelerate the product's
penetration in a sustainable manner.
The diffusion of highly efﬁcient technologies generally follows
an S curve (Rogers, 1962, 2003). At ﬁrst, only a few early adopters
will be willing to risk investing in a new, more expensive
technology, so market penetration is small. After some time, when
the technology has proven itself, the technology's market pene-
tration rates increase more quickly. Then market penetration of
the technology levels off and only “laggards” are still resistant to
adopting the new technology.
Fig. 2 illustrates how market interventions can help speed the
diffusion of highly efﬁcient technologies and can have permanent
effects.
Standard and labeling (S&L) programs are generally the ﬁrst
order of policy intervention to transform the market of a speciﬁc
end-use. S&L programs certify and rank technologies according
to their efﬁciency and remove inefﬁcient technologies from the
market, thus raising the efﬁciency ﬂoor. Incentive programs are
more easily implementable if a standard and labeling program
already exists. The graph illustrates a cycle of market transfor-
mation, which begins with inefﬁcient models being regulated
out of the market through minimum energy performance
standards (MEPS). Next ﬂeet efﬁciency is raised using incentive
programs. Incentives programs target HE technologies with the
best efﬁciency rating identiﬁed by the labeling program. They
raise the efﬁciency ceiling through a combination of upstream,
midstream and downstream programs that address speciﬁc
market barriers.
Incentives increase demand, and thus market penetration,
for early-stage HE technologies, leading to economies of scale
for manufacturers. Economies of scale, and the learning effects
engendered by increased demand, streamline production and
decrease the costs of production. The efﬁciency gains achieved
through the incentive program can then be cemented by imple-
menting standards that are more ambitious, resulting in a
continuous cycle of improvement. This cycle can be repeated
indeﬁnitely as innovation produces more and more efﬁcient
technologies. Other market interventions, such as most-efﬁcient
awards, energy-efﬁcient procurement or awareness programs
can help complement this cycle to further accelerate the
diffusion rate.
In countries with slow-moving standards and labeling pro-
grams or weak standards, incentive programs can help jump-start
negotiations to set higher efﬁciencies. Incentive programs can also
make ambitious standards politically acceptable to local manufac-
turers and the public. In addition, incentive programs inﬂuence
consumer purchase decisions and, where a labeling program is
also in place, they help educate the public about the beneﬁts of the
Table 2
Source of government funding for incentive programs
Funding source Examples
Government budget  Most tax and subsidy incentive programs
Stimulus funds  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009
 Japan’s Eco-point Program
International ﬁnancial
institution
 Mexico’s PNSEE
 India’s SEEP
Revolving fund  Germany’s KfW loans
 U.S.’s PACE program
Feebate  South Korea’s promotion of
energy-efﬁcient goods
 India’s BLY programProgrammatic clean
Development
mechanism (CDM)
Rate charge  Brazil’s wire charge
 Korea’s electric power infrastructure
fund and investments in demand side
management
 U.S. state energy-efﬁciency programs
 UK carbon emissions reduction
target (CERT)
Standards & Labeling Programs
Early 
Adopters
Early 
Majority
LaggardsLate 
Majority
Upstream Programs
Midstream  Programs
Downstream Programs
Educational Programs
Time
Standards & Labeling Programs
Highly- Efficient 
Equipment 
Diffusion Rate
Fig. 2. Impact of market interventions on highly-efﬁcient technology diffusion rate.
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higher-efﬁciency products in the labeling program. The existence
of a consumer rebate is a signal in itself, underscoring the value of
the labeling program. Incentive rebates are often linked to high-
performance products (i.e., products that are labeled as highly
efﬁcient).
Evaluations show that ﬁnancial incentive programs are often
most effective when they target products or efﬁciencies that have
a small market share. Lees' evaluation of earlier British schemes,
the Energy Efﬁciency Commitment (EEC) 1 and 2, shows that the
share of free ridership (those who take advantage of incentives but
would have purchased the efﬁcient products even without the
incentives) increases as the market share of an efﬁcient product
increases (Lees, 2008). That analysis suggests that technologies
with a market penetration greater than 30–40 percent do not need
to be ﬁnancially incentivized. Based on similar results, Gold and
Nadel (2011) conclude that incentive programs should last for only
a limited time, usually around 5 years, because incentives become
less effective over time. Different program designs can follow that
target harder to reach consumers or laggards. Rosenberg and
Hoefgen (2009) note that multiple coordinated market interven-
tions over an extended period are more likely to affect the
behavior of market actors than programs that include a single
intervention during a short period of time. Over time, a program
can increase the overall efﬁciency of the products on the market.
Gold and Nadel (2011) found that the U.S. refrigerator tax credit
upstream program has been largely successful because each
extension of the program pushed the efﬁciency standard higher
so that the next set of incentives would further increase the
energy saved. One of the reasons for the program's success was
robust stakeholder involvement and education regarding how to
participate in the program. Nadel et al.’s (2003) review of market
transformation initiatives in the United States points out that
successful initiatives are multi-pronged efforts that include incen-
tives as well as training and promotion.
Program designs vary signiﬁcantly and are determined by such
elements as, efﬁciency level targeted, amount of incentive offered,
the incentive beneﬁciaries, the form of incentive instrument,
eligibility criteria and whether the program includes a recycling
component. Table 3 lists incentive program design elements.
2.3.1. Incentive recipient
Typically, incentives are provided directly to the customer.
However, incentives can be provided to several other actors upst-
ream of the consumer in the supply chain. To overcome speciﬁc
market barriers, program administrators have gradually expanded
the stakeholders to whom incentives are directed. For example,
an increasing number of programs incentivize manufacturers to
produce more efﬁcient equipment. Retailers and distributors
have also been targeted with incentives especially when product
availability is a barrier to market penetration of more efﬁcient
equipment. Programs targeting consumers are referred to as
“downstream” programs, programs targeting retailers and distri-
butors are referred to as “midstream,” and programs targeting
manufacturers are referred to as “upstream.”
Fig. 3 shows the upstream, midstream, and downstream
points in a product delivery chain to which incentives can be
directed. The ﬁgure also presents the main barriers to energy
efﬁciency that each type of incentive program is designed to
address, and the advantages and disadvantages of different
program design options.
Upstream incentives are particularly effective for reducing the up-
front cost of technologies that are at an early stage of penetration.
Upstream incentives are offered to manufacturers to streamline
their production lines and increase production at a lower price. The
main advantage of these programs is that they can inﬂuence a large
portion of the market through fewer actors and therefore have
lower transaction costs. Moreover, by reducing the price before
products reach the market, the incentive has more impact on
purchase price than a downstream incentive.1 This multiplier effect,
which results from retailer markup, can be signiﬁcant, as illustrated
in the California example in Section 3.3.3. The main disadvantages
of upstream programs are that ﬁnancial incentives offered to
manufacturers are not seen by consumers and that robust monitor-
ing and veriﬁcation are required to ensure the incentive is passed
through to the consumers (Friedmann, 2011). Another drawback is
that implementing these programs successfully requires estimating
howmuch it will cost to the manufacturer to produce more efﬁcient
products so that the program administrator can negotiate a fair
price for the incentive.
Midstream incentives encourage retailers to stock or sell a larger
percentage of highly efﬁcient products. These programs inﬂuence
customers at their point of decision and help address the lack of
availability of highly efﬁcient products. They can be particularly
effective when a consumer is replacing equipment in an emer-
gency and the purchase decision depends on the immediate
availability of a product. Targeting midstream actors can also be
advantageous in split incentive situations as illustrated in the
Texas example in Section 3.2. in which a rebate was offered to
installers who purchased central air conditioners. Midstream
programs also educate and motivate retailers to promote highly
efﬁcient technologies in general and to use electricity bill savings
as a selling point for the products. A midstream program can be
particularly effective when a program budget is small and the
price of equipment is high. Because the proﬁt margin for dis-
tributors and retailers tends to be small, even a small increase in
proﬁt from an incentive can give a retailer signiﬁcant motivation
to sell more-efﬁcient equipment. A new program design called
“market lift” rewarded retailers when their energy efﬁcient pro-
duct sale share increases above a pre-established baseline (Winch
et al., 2010). However, focusing on the midstream point in the
supply chain means more transaction costs than an upstream
program (although fewer than in a downstream program). In
addition, midstream programs tend to focus on a selection of
distributors and retailers and therefore may not reach all the
distribution channels. As a result, these incentives only affect the
portion of the market that is reached by the participating retailers
and/or distributors. Furthermore, it could be argued that choosing
which retailer or distributor participates in a program is effectively
“picking winners” and penalizing other retailers who are not
chosen.
Table 3
Elements of program design.
Efﬁciency criteria  What is the efﬁciency level targeted
by the incentive program?
Incentive amount  What is the amount of incentive offered?
Incentive recipient  Who is the program’s target participant?
Form of incentive  What form of incentive is offered (a tax
credit, cash rebate, low-interest loan, etc.)?
Eligibility
requirements
 Are there any eligibility criteria to participate
to the program?
Recycling
component
 Does the program include a recycling
component (most often included in replacement
programs)?
1 For example, if a light bulb is marked up 40 percent above its manufacturing
cost, a $1 incentive to the consumer will discount the price of the bulb by $1, but
the same $1 incentive to the manufacturer will discount the customer price of the
bulb by $1.40 because the price is reduced before the markup is applied. This is the
multiplier effect of an upstream program.
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Downstream incentives have the advantage of raising consumer
awareness of highly efﬁcient products, which has positive spil-
lover2 effects on other energy-efﬁciency purchases. The existence
of a rebate is a signal in itself and may even be more important
than the cash amount in some cases. Moreover, downstream
programs have the ﬂexibility to be directed to select populations,
such as low-income households. A disadvantage of downstream
programs is the transaction costs involved in engaging and giving
rebates to large numbers of customers on an individual basis.
2.4. Evaluation
Policies and programs are not systematically and consistently
evaluated. Governments do not always allocate time and money to
evaluate their programs in detail. In addition, a particular program
may have multiple goals, which can be broad, especially when
they encompass research and development elements; this com-
plicates evaluation of the program's success. Evaluation of rate-
funded programs tends to be conducted more systematically as a
necessary input to planning for future resource investment, and
impact evaluations are generally part of the development of these
programs (U.S. EPA, 2007). According to the 2012 CEE report,
evaluation, measurement, and veriﬁcation accounted for an aver-
age 3.6 percent of the total amount budgeted for U.S. rate-funded
energy-efﬁciency programs.
2.4.1. Energy savings
Methods of accounting for energy savings differ widely from
one country to another and have a signiﬁcant impact on results.
For example, in California, the CPUC goal is expressed in annual
savings accumulated during the 3-year program period whereas in
Europe, the target is generally expressed in lifetime savings,
encompassing aggregated savings accrued over the expected life
of a measure installed during the program period.
In addition, different methods are used to calculate net savings,
both among countries and among U.S. states. An incentive pro-
gram's net savings are the percentage of energy savings strictly
attributable to the program. Net savings do not include savings
from program participants who would have undertaken the
efﬁciency activities in the absence of the program (free riders)
but include savings that resulted from the program's inﬂuence
(spillovers). Net savings also exclude the demand-reduction effects
of other programs – such as standards and labeling, building
codes, and other ﬁnancial incentive policies – and of external
phenomena such as economic recession or accelerated economic
growth. Determining net savings can be difﬁcult when, for
example, different entities (such as utilities, national governments,
and even local governments) offer ﬁnancial incentives to the same
set of consumers for the same appliance. Other considerations
include the “rebound” effect, i.e., that reductions in energy costs
cause customers to increase their energy use, diminishing the
actual energy savings achieved.
Evaluations conducted during program implementation are also
valuable for informing policy makers about possible ﬂaws that can
then be corrected. For example, when utilities in the US ﬁrst
encouraged the use of CFLs, some technologies did not performed as
well as the replaced technology. This was corrected by the implemen-
tation of performance standards but, unfortunately, this experience
left indelible trace in some customers’ perception of CFL quality.
In an evaluation, it is important to assess possible side effects
(both costs and beneﬁts) that might result from a policy so that
decision makers have adequate information to determine whether
to expand, limit, adapt, or continue the policy. For example,
evaluations can assess impacts on peak electricity load (e.g., in
the case of an air conditioner program), GHG emissions, jobs,
public health (e.g., mercury from CFLs), water usage, and social
equity. Despite their value, these types of evaluations are rarely
conducted because they do not relate directly to policy goals and
require signiﬁcant time and resources.
2.4.2. Cost effectiveness
The success of a policy can be measured by determining if the
policy goal has been met and evaluating how effectively it has
been met. The costs of reducing consumption are a major concern
for policy makers. However, measuring the success and calculating
the cost effectiveness of energy-efﬁciency programs are very
challenging tasks. Cost-effectiveness analyses assess the ratio of
dollars spent per unit of energy saved and are typically considered
an extension of impact evaluations. Many parameters enter into
the cost-beneﬁt analysis equation, notably due to the fact that
energy savings can never be observed directly, but only inferred
(Joskow and Marron, 1992; Sonnenblick and Eto, 1995; Eto et al.,
1996; Prindle, 2009; Woolf et al., 2012; Ting et al., 2013; Kushler et
al., 2014). Other parameters enter into the equation, such as the
discount rate, which is used to calculate the present value of future
savings from the measure implemented, and the ability to
Manufacturers
Upstream Programs
Distributors & Retailers
Midstream Programs
Consumers
Downstream Programs
Barriers Addressed:
-Uncompetitive price
-Small or non-existent    
production of highly efficient 
equipment
-Low energy price
Main Advantages:
-Small number of actors
-Multiplicative effect on retail 
price
Main Disadvantages:
-Opaque to consumers
-Evaluating manufacturing cost
-Picking winners (manuf. firms)
-Monitoring and Evaluation 
Barriers Addressed:
-Lack of available products
-Lack of marketing outreach
Main Advantages:
-Leverages marketing capabilities
-Meets customers at point of 
decision
-Gives rebate at point of purchase
Main Disadvantages:
-Chosen firms only supply part of 
the market
-Picking winners (distribution or 
retail firms)
Barriers Addressed:
-Perceived risk of energy-
efficiency investments
-Lack of  information
-Limited access to capital
Main Advantages:
-Allows incentive to be 
directed to specific groups 
e.g., the low income
-Positive spillover effect
Main Disadvantages:
-Large number of actors
-Need marketing to reach 
more participants
Fig. 3. Incentive program design along the supply chain.
2 Positive spillover effect refers to the adoption of energy-efﬁcient products by
program non-participants as a result of increased knowledge about the beneﬁts of
energy efﬁciency.
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measure savings that are net of other effects, as discussed in the
previous section. On the other side of the equation, the deﬁnition
and methods to calculate “avoided costs” of electricity supply
resources can also vary according to source and no national or
international benchmark exists.
In a review of 31 US states’ ratepayer-funded energy efﬁciency
programs, a study conducted by Lawrence Berkeley National Labora-
tory found the levelized cost of saved energy for utilities to be US
$0.021 per kWh, assuming a six percent discount rate (Billingsley et
al 2014). A similar review of 20 US states by the American Council for
an Energy Efﬁcient Economy (ACEEE) came to a comparable esti-
mate: $0.028 per kWh (Molina 2014). Arimura et al. (2011) found
that ratepayer funded energy efﬁciency programs in the US resulted
in cost to utilities of US$0.05 per kWh saved when future savings are
discounted at a 5 percent rate. In a study looking at European
countries that have implemented white certiﬁcates, (Giraudet et al
2011) found that the cost of energy efﬁciency programs was in
average €0.009 per kWh saved in Great Britain and €0.037 per kWh
saved in France, with a discount rate of 4 percent.
These studies ﬁnd the cost of saved energy from rate funded
energy efﬁciency programs compares favorably to the cost of
energy supply options. The cost of energy efﬁciency programs
varies widely according to the measure considered and the region-
speciﬁc regulatory eligibility criteria. A rigorous cost beneﬁt
analysis of programs is an important step before and after
implementation since their success relies in part on the assurance
that they are indeed being run cost-effectively. Cost effectiveness
analyses should include appropriate treatment of what incentives
have actually bought. For example, the kWh savings attributed to a
program must include savings from spillover effects (see Section
2.3.1) but discount any free rider effects, savings from units
purchased by consumers who would have bought the unit even
in the absence of the incentive.
3. Examples of programs
This section presents a variety of examples to illustrate how
incentive programs have been implemented in different countries.
The examples listed in Table 4 are not meant to be exhaustive but
to illustrate current country program designs. The examples listed
in the table are detailed in the subsequent sections.
3.1. Downstream programs
The subsections below describe the typical ﬁscal instruments
used for downstream incentives as well as other types of down-
stream programs that offer award points and replacement of
inefﬁcient appliances.
3.1.1. Downstream ﬁscal instruments
Fiscal instruments, which include income and sales tax reduc-
tion, are popular incentives implemented by governments. A 2012
BPIE survey of Europe found that three countries had tax credit
incentive programs, 11 countries had tax reduction schemes, and
eight countries had VAT reduction schemes (BPIE, 2012). In total,
14 out of 29 EU Member States reported one or more ﬁscal
incentives. Most of the incentives covered residential-sector efﬁ-
ciency improvements, the main focus of this study.
Since 2005, France has had a successful tax credit3, the Crédit
d’Impôt Développement Durable (CIDD). As of 2010, more than
one household in ﬁve, i.e., 6.2 million households, had beneﬁted
from the French tax credit (French Ministry of Sustainable
Development, 2012). Tax credits can be claimed for the purchase
Table 4
Incentive program examples.
Country Program Time frame Form Recipient Administrator Funding Energy-efﬁcient product
Downstream France Sustainable Development
Tax Credit
2005 to
present
Tax credit Consumers Government General
budget
Boilers, home insulation, heat
pumps, windows, renewable
energy
Italy Tax Deduction for Energy
Savings
2007 to
present
Tax deduction
replacement
Consumers Government General
budget
Efﬁcient equipment and home
insulation
UK Reduced VAT 1998 to
present
VAT reduction Consumers Government General
budget
Insulation material, heating
control systems, heat pumps,
wood-fueled boilers
S. Korea Carbon Cashbag October
2008
Eco-points Consumers Local
Government
General and
local budget
Home electronics, appliances
Japan Eco-point 2009-2011 Eco-points Consumers Local
Government
Stimulus
package
Air conditioners, refrigerators,
TVs
Mexico PNSEE 2009-
ongoing
Replacement
on-bill
ﬁnancing
Consumers Government International
institution
Refrigerators, air conditioners
Midstream U.S.
(TX)
Distributor Air
Conditioning Market
Transformation
2001 to
2004
Rebate Retailers Utility Rate funded Central air-conditioning units
U.S.
(CA)
California Business and
Consumer Electronics (BCE)
Since 2007 Rebate Distributors Utility Rate funded Televisions, computer monitors
Upstream China Promotion Products
Program
2008 to
present
Upstream
subsidy
Manufacturers Government General
budget
CFLs, air conditioners, TV, water
heaters, washing machines,
refrigerators
India Super Energy-Efﬁcient
Equipment Program (SEEP)
In
development
Upstream
subsidy
Manufacturers Government International
institution
Ceiling fans
Sweden Ground-source Heat Pumps
Technology Procurement
Program
1993 Upstream
technology
procurement
Manufacturers Government General
budget
Ground-source heat pumps
U.S. Federal Energy-Efﬁciency
Tax Incentives for
Manufacturers
2005 to 2011 Upstream tax
credit
Manufacturers Government General
budget
Residential refrigerators, clothes
washers, dishwashers
U.S.
(CA)
California Upstream
Lighting program
2006 to
2008
Upstream buy
down
Manufacturers Utility Rate funded CFLs
3 Tax credits directly reduce the taxes the consumer pays while tax deductions
lower the consumer’s taxable income.
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of efﬁcient boilers, heat pumps, windows, and renewable energy
equipment. From 2005 to 2011, the tax credit averaged 1.94 billion
euros per year of lost revenue to the government (Nauleau, 2013).
Since 2007, the Italian government has offered a tax deduction
of 55 percent for the replacement of heating and air conditioning
systems with more efﬁcient units and for the cost of other home
efﬁciency improvements (Pistochini and Valentini, 2011). Until
December 2010, the program included a tax deduction of 20
percent for the replacement of old refrigerators (Ministero dello
Sviluppo Economico, n.d). A tax deduction of 50 percent was
recently added for the replacement of “white” appliances (refrig-
erators, washers, dryers, ovens, gas cookers, and freezers).
The main drawback of income tax incentives is that the
taxpayer must pay the efﬁcient equipment's up-front cost and
recoup a part of that cost later through tax deductions or credits.
The need to pay the full up-front cost deters some customers from
taking advantage of this type of incentive, especially customers
who are sensitive to up-front costs. This type of program design
tends to be more attractive to those making larger investments in
residential equipment.
Since 1998, the UK government has offered a reduced VAT for
energy-saving products. Today, a VAT of 5 percent (instead of the
normal 20 percent) is offered for the purchase of energy-saving
residential products such as heat pumps and insulation materials.
When these products are installed in new houses, a zero VAT applies.
The program does not cover white appliances. (UK HMRC, 2013)
A VAT reduction has the advantage of being perceived by the
consumer at the point of purchase. However, there is a risk that
the VAT reduction might not be fully passed through in retail
prices. In addition, the total amount of the reduction is limited by
the amount of tax applicable to a product's price.
3.1.2. Consumer reward points
Two countries – Japan and South Korea – have implemented
subsidies in the form of reward points to encourage consumers to
select highly efﬁcient technologies. This innovative approach aims
to promote low-carbon lifestyles by encouraging consumer
responsibility and awareness.
In October 2008, South Korea launched the “Carbon Cashbag”
program, operated by Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE) and
the Korean Energy Management Corporation (KEMCO). Consumers
who purchase low-carbon products get carbon credits from
manufacturers, retailers, or banks that participate in the program.
Points are stored on a Carbon Cashbag card and can be used for
discounts on public transportation, basic utility charges, purchases
of other efﬁcient appliances, or tickets to cultural events. The
program is voluntary, and companies that participate beneﬁt from
reductions in advertising fees and other public incentives. As of
October 2011, 33 companies were participating in the program,
with 18 products and 333 sub-products (McNeil et al., 2012).
The Japanese government ran the Eco-Point System from May
2009 to March 2011 as part of Japan's stimulus package. The goals
of the scheme were threefold: stimulate the economy, accelerate
penetration of high-energy-savings products, and assist the transi-
tion to digital television. This program granted eco-points for the
purchase of air conditioners, refrigerators, and televisions that
were rated four or more stars by the national energy-efﬁciency
S&L program. The points, worth ¥1 each, could be exchanged for
three types of goods: coupons and prepaid cards, highly efﬁcient
products, and products that promoted regional economies. The
program's total budget was ¥693 billion ($8.7 billion)4 (Japanese
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), 2010). An
evaluation by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
found that the program was very successful. The share of products
shipped that had four or more stars increased from 20 percent to
96 percent for air conditioners, from 30 percent to 98 percent for
refrigerators, and from about 84 percent to 99 percent for televi-
sions. This resulted in estimated savings of 2.7 million tons of CO2
per year. However, the program is also considered to have resulted
in increased imports and caused a sharp decline in Japanese
electronics sales (Aoshima and Shimizu, 2012). In 2012, Japan
reinstated the Eco-Point program, adding awards for post-disaster
reconstruction and wider diffusion of earthquake-proof and energy-
efﬁcient housing.
3.1.3. Replacement programs
Replacement programs, also called early retirement and direct
installation programs, replace inefﬁcient residential appliances
before the end of their useful lives with signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient
appliances. This reduces electricity use by both encouraging the
deployment of efﬁcient appliances and ensuring that older, less-
efﬁcient appliances are removed from the stock. These programs
have the added advantage of minimizing the potential of a rebound
effect in which a household would expand its appliance capacity by
keeping and continuing to use the older less-efﬁcient appliances in
addition to the new one.
Mexico's PNSEE has replaced large numbers of old appliances
(Salaverría and Patricia 2010; SENER 2010). The program offers
government-funded subsidies to consumers to replace their old
refrigerators and air conditioners with new, more-efﬁcient models.
The subsidies cover a portion of the price of the new appliance and
the costs for transportation, storage, and disposal for removing the
old appliance. To receive the subsidy, consumers must surrender
functioning refrigerators and room air conditioners that must be
10 years old or older. Davis et al. (2013) evaluated the program and
found that it only reduced refrigerator electricity consumption by
7 percent and actually increased air conditioning electricity con-
sumption because of a rebound effect: consumption increased as a
result of energy efﬁciency.
3.2. Midstream programs
Targeting midstream actors can be particularly advantageous in
split incentive situations. For example, in the case of central air
conditioners, the product is usually purchased by the installer,
who has no stake in the costs of the energy it will consume.
Offering a rebate to installers for choosing efﬁcient equipment can
help mitigate this problem. This approach was used successfully in
Reliant Energy's 2001–2004 Air Conditioner Distributor program
in Houston, Texas. The program offered incentives to HVAC distri-
butors with the goal of promoting the sale of at least 7500 t
of central air conditioners that had a Seasonal Energy Efﬁciency
Ratio (SEER) of Z14 (with a minimum eligibility of 13) (Garland
et al., n.d.).
Because of their relative modest per unit savings, midstream
programs offer a good alternative to downstream program for
consumer electronics. When compare to a retailer’s proﬁct margin
on the product, incentives tend to be more signiﬁcant. This is
one of the reason that made California’s utilities designed the
Business and Consumer Electronics (BCE) Program in 2007. BCE
provides midstream incentives to large retailers for the sale of
high-efﬁciency consumer electronics, such as televisions and
computer monitors. During the 2011 program year, the BCE
program paid $13.8 million in rebates for more than 1.3 million
high-efﬁciency consumer electronics products sold (Energy
Solution, 2012).4 The 2011 exchange rate was 79.8 yen per US$.
S. de la Rue du Can et al. / Energy Policy 72 (2014) 56–66 63
3.3. Upstream programs
The subsections below describe three types of upstream
incentive designs: technology procurement, ﬁscal incentives, and
subsidies.
3.3.1. Technology procurement
Sweden was one of the countries that pioneered upstream
programs. In the early 1990s, the Swedish National Board for
Industrial and Technical Development (also known as NUTEK)
sponsored a technology procurement program in which a group of
buyers and experts developed speciﬁcations for highly efﬁcient
ground-source heat pumps. The group speciﬁed high-quality heat
pumps that were 30 percent more efﬁcient and 30 percent less
expensive than existing models on the market; the speciﬁcations
also required elimination of ozone-depleting gases. Manufacturers
were invited to compete to meet the group’s speciﬁcations, with a
guarantee that at least 2000 units of the winning model would be
purchased. This program successfully stimulated the production of
efﬁcient heat pumps and started a market transformation (Kiss et
al., 2012). Following this technology procurement program, highly
efﬁcient heat-pump models were supported by informational and
monetary incentives, and, today, Sweden has the highest installed
capacity of heat pumps per capita, and heat pumps are the most
common source of space heating in single-family residences in the
country, installed about 40 percent of homes (Lind, 2011). Evalua-
tions have shown that one reason for the success of the Swedish
technology procurement was that its development was primarily
driven by the requirements of a group of buyers (Kiss et al., 2012).
3.3.2. Upstream ﬁscal instruments
The U.S. Energy Policy Act of 2005 included a tax credit to
incentivize production of energy-efﬁcient refrigerator units. The U.S.
government agency responsible for tax collection, the Internal Rev-
enue Service, administered the program, whose goal was to transform
the market by inﬂuencing manufacturers to produce increasingly
energy-efﬁcient appliances. An evaluation by Gold and Nadel (2011)
found that these tax credits have been largely successful in stimulat-
ing robust stakeholder involvement and education;; furthermore,
each successful extension of the tax credit program pushed the
efﬁciency standard higher so that the next set of incentives would
“achieve higher levels of energy savings cost-effectively.”
3.3.3. Subsidies
China’s upstream subsidy program began with a CFL promotion
program in 2008. Suppliers received subsidies to provide a 30-
percent discount onwholesale purchases and a 50-percent discount
on retail sales. In 2009 and 2012, the government extended the
program to air conditioners, TVs, refrigerators, washing machines,
and water heaters. The program’s main goal is to promote energy-
saving home appliances and stimulate the economy to offset the
impact of the international economic crisis. To ensure that the
program has the intended impact, new rules require that manu-
facturers must verify product shipments by means of a retailer’s
sales receipt in order to receive the subsidy.
Upstream program have also been implemented by utilities, for
example, the California Upstream Lighting Program implemented
by California’s three largest investor-owned utilities. An evaluation
by KEMA (2010) of the 2006–2008 program estimates statewide
annual net savings to be about 1325 GWh, with net peak savings of
approximately 134 MW. California utilities provided incentives to
manufacturers averaging US$1.57 per bulb on nearly 100 million
CFLs, and the average consumer discount at the register was US$2.70
per bulb, resulting in a multiplier of 172 percent (KEMA, 2010). The
multiplier effect happens when a rebate given upstream is increased
by the product markup, which results in a larger discount for
consumers than if the rebate were given directly to them.
India’s SEEP aims to support development of equipment that is
50 percent more efﬁcient than current ﬁve-star appliances.5 The
program’s ﬁrst target is production of ceiling fans that consume
35W of power, instead of the 50 W consumed by current ﬁve-star
rating fans (Singh et al., 2012, Chunekar et al., 2011). An incentive
is planned for every SEEP fan sold by manufacturers. A recent
report from the Prayas Energy Group (Singh et al., 2012) describes
the group’s experience assisting the Indian Bureau of Energy
Efﬁciency (BEE) in the development of SEEP, from conception to
design and establishment of the implementation framework.
Many interesting details of the program’s design are described in
the Prayas report, for example how the technical speciﬁcation for
the eligible product was established in close collaboration with the
manufacturing industry and retail sector to take into consideration
local industry conditions and consumer preferences. A distinctive
feature of SEEP is that it gives manufacturers an opportunity to
design and market products that are not yet available to Indian
consumers.
3.4. Packages of programs
Different types of incentive programs can be implemented
simultaneously or consecutively. A combination of upstream, mid-
stream, and downstream programs can be used to help a market
grow and mature, addressing the barriers faced by different market
players—manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and consumers. Swe-
den is an interesting example of a long-term, integrated approach to
incentive programs that started with the technology procurement
program described in Section 3.3.1; that program was subsequently
complemented with subsidies, favorable loans, training, and infor-
mation campaigns.
The success of the Swedish programs and of other countries’
market transformation initiatives is also the result of continuous
monitoring and veriﬁcation of the programs’ impacts. Monitoring
and veriﬁcation provide needed information so that programs can
be adjusted over time to respond to the dynamic growth of
markets. For this reason, a budget should be earmarked for
monitoring, veriﬁcation, and evaluation of programs. Finally,
programs should be developed in close collaboration with all
stakeholders, and speciﬁcations for highly efﬁcient equipment
should be developed according to consumer preferences. Even
programs that target manufacturers should be driven by the needs
and preferences of consumers.
4. Conclusions and policy implications
Regulatory frameworks across many countries have been
developed to induce the establishment of incentive programs,
and there has been signiﬁcant innovation and evolution in the
design of these programs. The greatest challenges for incentive
programs continue to be identiﬁcation of market barriers, design
of programs that successfully overcome barriers over the long
term, and mobilization of stable, sustainable funding for energy-
efﬁciency incentives.
Incentive programs often pay the up-front cost of efﬁcient
equipment and therefore require signiﬁcant capitalization. Rate-
funded programs inherently have a sustainable funding source and
validate energy efﬁciency as a cost-effective energy resource for
planning purposes. Other sources of funding include – but are not
limited to – feebates, revolving loan funds, and CDMs. Policy
5 The ﬁve-star rating is the highest rating available in India.
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makers should share experiences to inspire the development of
additional new funding mechanisms, including those to suit
unique local circumstances.
Successful programs address the barriers that hinder the pene-
tration of highly efﬁcient products at different stages of a product’s
market diffusion. These programs use a holistic market transforma-
tion strategy in which upstream, midstream, and downstream
incentives are part of a package of interventions that speed the
adoption of more-ambitious standards. Incentive programs comple-
ment mandatory standards by accelerating market penetration of
products that are more energy efﬁcient than standards require,
thereby preparing the market for future increases in the stringency
of the standards.
Successful programs also depend on evaluation, monitoring, and
veriﬁcation, which in turn require a budget earmarked for those
purposes. Evaluation should shed light not only on energy savings
achieved and emissions reduced but also on lessons learned in
program implementation so that these ﬁndings are shared globally
to help other countries avoid trial-and-error learning.
There is no silver bullet for energy efﬁciency; policy must be
developed on a case-by-case basis to respond to market barriers
and must embrace local conditions.
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